

ate but ethically inappropriate or inappropriate materially but appropriate ethically. We should take such discomfort as encouragement to work in ways that are both materially and ethically appropriate.

Wayne State University
Detroit, Michigan

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Writing on Tour: Rethinking the Travel Metaphor

Gregory Clark

My work in rhetoric and composition theory tends to address problems that follow from individualism among people who must live and work together. As John Dewey succinctly puts it, these are problems "of adjusting groups and individuals to one another" (181). Such problems can be solved, he continues, as people learn "a *distinctive* way of behaving in conjunction and *connection* with other distinctive ways of acting, not a self-enclosed way of acting, independent of everything else" (*Public* 188). In "Writing as Travel," I presented a model of individual identity that would enable people to do just that. I ended that essay with a summary

of a little-known series of lectures that Dewey gave a century ago at the normal school that became the university where I now work. Education, he says, should develop "all the powers of the individual" for the purpose of preparing the person "to play his proper part in the community or state in which he is a member" (*Lectures* 17). That is the sort of education that can adjust groups and individuals to one another by teaching people to act in conjunction and connection with others. "Writing as Travel" was an attempt to articulate a concept of rhetorical identity that might enable writers to act in such a manner.

I used travel as a metaphor for rhetorical interaction because travel puts people into situations where they must act in "conjunction and connection" with unfamiliar others. Outside the boundaries of their home territories, people may experience an anonymity that undermines their habitual assumptions and attitudes. Those situations offer them opportunities to become less "self-enclosed" as they look for the "proper part" they might play there. But the metaphor, as I develop it in that essay, is problematic. The concept of traveler that dominates my discussion is that of the recreational tourist—a role, as Nedra Reynolds notes, with which not all readers can, or should, identify. Furthermore, my discussion of that traveler as a rhetorical agent cut loose from territorial identity tends to recommend a relinquishing of individual identity altogether ("Personal" 261). In this case, my use of the travel metaphor limits rhetorical identity to two opposing choices: one that is self-enclosed, autonomous, and territorial, or one that embraces every transformation of self that follows from encounters with others who share the road. Rather than enabling groups and individuals to adjust to one another, each of these identities tends to negate the other.

In what follows, I want to revisit the travel metaphor briefly with these problems in mind. Then, in an attempt to model a more constructive encounter of individuals and groups, I'll offer an early summary of my thinking about an alternative metaphor for rhetorical identity and interaction in which the success of the group is an expression of the strong individual identities of its members.

Further Thoughts on Travel

As an earlier critic of "Writing as Travel" observed, relinquishing one's identity is one thing for an altruistic tenured professor, but quite another for many of the others who teach writing (Socolow). And Reynolds reminds me that tenure is not the only privilege that shapes my thinking in ways that obscure some limitations implicit in the metaphor of traveler.

Hence, I read her essay as a welcome corrective to mine that shows how matters of identity in rhetorical interaction are clearly, to use Kenneth Burke's late mantra, "more complicated than that" (*Rhetoric* 277). Reynolds responds to my call for a rhetoric that abandons territoriality with a more complicated, and probably more realistic, proposal: "rather than advocating travel to get us away from the discourses of territoriality, we should work toward an understanding of the contested spaces that keep people divided" (560).

Understanding these contestations—and what is at stake in them for individuals and groups—requires us to deal with the destructive potential inherent in those self-enclosed ways of interacting that follow when individuals identify themselves territorially. Safe within their home boundaries, individuals have little incentive to learn ways of behaving in conjunction and connection with those who are not at home there. Moreover, Reynolds' own research at the University of Leeds demonstrates that territorial identities work both to keep people from crossing those boundaries to encounter others whose identities are different and to keep them vigilant against those others who might cross inside and change their sense of "home." That is a fact of social life. But it is also a problem, and increasingly so. That is why I remain interested in Dewey's ideal of an education that would develop "all the powers of the individual" for the purpose of preparing each one to contribute to his or her own communities or collectivities. I still think that education—and, particularly, rhetorical education—must counter some of the negative lessons of territoriality.

Reynolds is right about travel: "in the 'real world' people don't move around that much" (543). And the material imperatives that drive most of our actions in the world make it difficult, if not impossible, to enact the transient sort of identity that "Writing as Travel" tried to describe. Her research exposes the good reasons of security and convenience that keep people at home in places that, constituted culturally as well as spatially, provide them with the elements of identity. But it is also true that in the real world others who do not belong are increasingly making homes for themselves in everyone's territory, prompting the residents to protect both their places and the identities they have formed there. I am looking for models of rhetorical interaction that can reduce the tensions that follow when different people find themselves sharing the same place, and that is what I was reaching for in "Writing as Travel." That search may be idealistic, and idealism can blind us. However, ideals can also be made accountable to reality, and that is what I am working to do here.

It still seems to me that travel can expand people's experience of what Dale Sullivan terms "the common dwelling place" that "enfolds" them in collectivity with others (127). Sullivan uses these terms to describe the epideictic function of rhetoric that asserts as exemplary the attitudes and actions of those people who share a situation and place. John Jackson also describes places as doing that kind of epideictic rhetorical work. As we travel, Jackson explains, we encounter images that prompt us "to identify ourselves and our desires with the landscape, by asking ourselves how any man would fare who had to live in it." He contends that as travelers we experience in each new place "a concrete, three-dimensional, shared reality" within which we must, at least imaginatively, identify ourselves (343). In Burkean terms, what travelers encounter are alternative "scenes" for both identity and action, and those scenes are the "grounds for identification" (see Sheard 299). I turned to the travel metaphor to explore how experiencing new scenes might enable individuals to adopt more expansive identities.

Problems of identity are my central concern as I study and teach rhetoric—particularly those problems that develop when individuals have difficulty accommodating the differences of others. I explained to that earlier critic of "Writing as Travel" that I wrote the essay in an attempt "to reconceive identity within a communication transaction" in ways that would "enable individual transformation and collective cooperation" ("Personal" 261), and that is still my general project. The concept of identity developed in "Writing as Travel," however, tends to require a suppression of the individual. Today I am exploring an alternative metaphor for rhetorical interaction in which individuals can express, and even enhance, their separate identities by contributing to the project and the progress of a group.

Identity and Improvisation

Maybe writing isn't very much like traveling after all. Maybe it's more like playing in a jazz band. That idea suggested itself when the spring tour of the Lincoln Center Jazz Orchestra came through town while I was working on "Writing as Travel." I liked jazz, though not big band, but I went to the concert anyway—and I loved it. The music engaged me intellectually, but even better, it lifted me up and out of my usual state of mild discouragement. Wynton Marsalis punctuated the performance with comments and demonstrations that explained the emotional power of the music as well as its intellectual interest. I didn't take notes on what he said that night—it was, after all, a jazz concert.

I've since learned that the things he said that night he has also said elsewhere.

Most importantly perhaps, Marsalis explains that “jazz music more than any other music has its foot in the camp of ritual. . . . It serves the same function” (“One” 31). That function is, simply put, to bring people together in an intense, shared experience of their commonality. Many rituals do that, but jazz does it in a particularly populist way: by directing highly individual performances into a single aesthetic presentation that is unified by a common emotion. Indeed, jazz only works—to express emotion with clarity and energy—when each musician brings to the performance the personal knowledge and skill that enables him or her, as Marsalis puts it, to “testify of your existence” (telephone interview, 11 Sept. 2000). The power of the ensemble performance depends on the intensity of each musician’s personal testimony, on the quality of each individual’s intention to bring ability and feeling together to express to others some truth about the existence we share. It feels individualistic, but it functions collectively. Marsalis explains: “Your intent to deliver this thing of beauty has to be pure enough to overcome fear of what the response may be. . . . Anyway, even the most intimate details of what you have to say through your horn, the audience already knows. Because they live it” (*Sweet* 18). The ritual power of jazz is rooted in these individual testaments of human experience, and it is made accessible to others by their expression within the context of a group performance. What transforms individual expressions into ensemble music that gathers in and lifts performers and listeners alike is the experience—felt individually and shared collectively—of “swing.” Swing is that subtle yet insistent jazz beat that, even at its most sedate, moves every person who attends to it to tap finger or foot or nod a head to its rhythm. It is this swing, says Marsalis, that expresses the “identity” of the music (“One” 33). Identity—individual and collective—is what this music is about, and performers express themselves together in ways that bring them and their listeners into an experience of their commonality. That is what cheered me up at that concert that night.

After the concert, the band continued on its tour and I went back to work, but with new things to consider. Marsalis had explained what he explains to almost every audience: jazz is essentially an aesthetic model of social interaction at its ethical best. It is music made by individuals working hard together to express themselves separately in ways that serve—and gather strength from—a common purpose. That purpose is to “testify,” individually and collectively, to the existence and capacity of

each person *and* of those people as a group. It is achieved only when individual expressions of identity come together within a shared structure that enables the group to swing. As Marsalis proposes, “playing jazz means learning to respect individuality,” and that requires “learning how to reconcile differences, even when they’re opposites.” That is because jazz teaches you how to have “a dialogue, with integrity” (“Music” 30).

He recently explained jazz to a group of high school band directors, saying that playing jazz well requires a particular kind of integrity—the kind that balances individual rights with responsibilities. The best jazz musicians—those who are both most accomplished and most “mature”—put first their responsibility to make space for the rights of the others in the group. The greatest achievement of this music, and the best reason to teach it, is that it requires performers to express themselves honestly and effectively within the context of an aesthetic identity that musicians and listeners together can share. For Marsalis, the central issue in jazz is not really musical at all: it is the perpetual problem of “I” versus “we”—of how “I” choose to relate to “we” (“Jazz”). In jazz, performers are free to address that issue in their own ways, but the quality of the music—and the efficacy of the experience of the people who share it—depends on the choices that each performer makes. Jazz swings when they each express themselves individually with an intensity that strengthens the structure of the common experience. That is the point he keeps returning to: the success of any jazz performance relies on the ability of good musicians to play with other people (telephone interview, 27 Mar. 2000). It is this “attempt to ‘get it together’ that makes group playing and group living successful” (*Marsalis* 133).

These statements resonate with rhetoric, and I have just recently begun thinking more carefully about what jazz performance can teach us about that fundamental rhetorical problem of “adjusting groups and individuals to one another.” My thinking has started with Marsalis, and hasn’t gone much further yet—but this is a good starting place. When Marsalis talks about jazz, he talks mostly about its cultural functions and particularly about the modes of interaction it requires. He talks in this way because he is an educator. As Artistic Director of Jazz at Lincoln Center, he teaches people about jazz because he believes that it can teach them to be better people. And when Marsalis teaches jazz, he teaches what amounts to citizenship. That is where his project connects with mine. His is not the only voice examining jazz as a model for ethical modes of interaction, and his conclusions are not the only ones. However, his ideas

offer a good introduction to the possibilities that jazz offers as a model for rhetorical identities and interactions that benefit group and individual alike.

Jazz, I have learned from Marsalis, is individual expression and collective ritual bound together in the vivid experience (intellectual and emotional, aesthetic and physical) of a common swing. Indeed, in jazz music “swing is the great mediator” (telephone interview, 27 Mar. 2000). Swing invites individuals to testify to their own existence with full attention to the responsible work of harmonious interaction with others. That attention must be ongoing because, as Marsalis says, “[s]wing isn’t rigid. Somebody might take the swing in a new direction, and you have to be ready to go that way. You’re constantly trying to coordinate with something that’s shifting and changing.” This close attention to each other is essential to the process of collective improvisation: “people getting together and making up music as a group” (“Music” 31). Improvisation requires “knowing how to work with whatever we have available,” and we have available, among other resources, those that particular individuals bring to the group. These are what individual performers draw on as they contribute to the collaborative experience of group performance. Identity in improvisation, then, involves both “accepting your role” in the collaboration and “expanding your role” to enhance the collective performance and enrich the shared experience (telephone interview, 11 Sept. 2000). Individual identity, though constrained by the collective, remains crucial: “In jazz the point is to achieve your identity on your instrument, no matter what role you play. You could play the most insignificant role in the music, just a simple riff—the challenge is, play that riff like you” (“Music” 31).

Jazz Rhetoric

I am working to articulate and teach a rhetoric that provides people with ways to communicate that enact individual goals while enabling them to collaborate with others with whom they share, if not goals, a situation of time and space. In such a rhetoric, individual identity is maintained and enhanced through the process of contributing to the life of the group. Such contributions require some preparation. Individuals who contribute to a jazz performance must know their own instruments, as well as the practices of harmony and rhythm and the genres of jazz that they share with the group. Furthermore, each player in an ensemble must know the parts that the others play, so that each one can listen and respond to the others as they perform. In remarks made at the first *Essentially Ellington*

Band Director Academy, Ronald Carter, one of the jazz educators at Lincoln Center, said that he requires his students first to clap and dance the swing of a piece and then to sing together each part before they even pick up their instruments and begin to play. This commitment to provide and to sustain a shared musical experience brings strong individual performances into a collaborative improvisation that testifies to the capacity of people to make something good for themselves together. Jazz is constituted of individual expressions constrained and created by an accountability to the rhythm, harmony, form, and feeling shared by the ensemble that combines these elements into music. As such, jazz models a solution to a central problem in rhetorical studies, a problem that Carolyn Miller describes as the need to mediate between the coherent “exigence” of social needs and structures and the divergent “intentions” of the individuals who constitute the society (158).

Clearly, jazz is not the only metaphor we can use to investigate this problem, but it is a useful representative anecdote, to use Burke’s term—that is, the metaphor of jazz is a particular case that is “supple and complex enough” to represent the complexities of the category it is used to explain (*Grammar* 60). People become jazz musicians by working hard on their own to learn both their instrument and the music. Playing jazz well requires working with others continually to learn to make the music together. As Marsalis puts it, “Jazz is a music of conversation, and that’s what you need in a democracy. You have to be willing to hear another person’s point of view and respond to it. Also, jazz requires that you have a lot of on-your-feet information, just like a democracy does. There are a lot of things you simply have to know” (“Music” 35). This view suggests some of the ways jazz can represent the larger category of rhetorical interaction. Like rhetoric, jazz is situational: it is “a way of interacting that occurs differently at different times and places” (telephone interview, 27 Mar. 2000). And like rhetoric, it has little power when its individual performers are unprepared technically or when they don’t understand the structures and forms within which others are working. Those people can’t improvise with others. Jazz also loses power when musicians who are knowledgeable and skilled and who can improvise but do not direct their individual performances toward the collaborative project of sustaining the collective swing. Marsalis connects the musical manifestation of that problem directly to the larger category: “In democracy, as in jazz, you have freedom with restraint. It’s not absolute freedom, it’s freedom within a structure” (“Music” 35). But perhaps the most useful way that jazz performance represents the larger category of the rhetorical interaction

that mediates the interests of groups and individuals is inherent in the concept of improvisation itself. In remarks made at the first *Essentially Ellington* Band Directory Academy held in Aspen, Colorado, Marsalis said, "Improvisation requires coming to grips with the unforeseen—taking the circumstances available and making something cohesive—developing your own idea through the common form." That is a concise description, it seems to me, of what rhetorical interaction requires of individuals.

There are other, very specific reasons why I think it is worthwhile to investigate jazz as a model of rhetorical identity and interaction. Throughout its history, jazz has been notably integrative in a society constructed of divisions. Arguably, jazz emerged in New Orleans as a blend of genteel and folk musical traditions that, at least there, the boundaries of difference could not keep apart (Lomax). Jazz performance is one of the first "places" in America where the races began to mix more or less freely and comfortably. From its beginnings, jazz attracted performers and audiences from across not only racial but also gender, class, and national boundaries. The music is also integrative in intrapersonal ways inasmuch as it engages the intellect and emotion, the body and soul of those within earshot. It is aesthetic in the fullest sense—that sense in which art brings meaning and order to the world that we experience by remaking it in an image that is profoundly shared.

I continue to look to jazz to understand rhetoric and particularly to find solutions to problems that a self-enclosed individualism can create in human interactions. I first caught a glimpse of these solutions as I watched that group of seventeen touring musicians play jazz. I sensed then, and believe still, that there is something fundamental going on here that models a very positive way of enabling individuals and groups to adjust to one another. Maybe we should try understanding rhetorical interaction something like the work of a jazz musician—and that work is the same whether the band is on tour or not. As Marsalis explains to his music students, "a large portion of your musical life will be spent in group practice, and most of your greatest moments in music are the results of a group effort. Actually, the same thing is true outside of music" (Marsalis 133). I agree, and I am interested in finding ways to understand better, and to teach people more effectively, how to do that well.

Brigham Young University
Provo, Utah

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Eavesdropping on Others

Krista Ratcliffe

About the time I finished reading Michelle Ballif, Diane Davis, and Roxanne Mountford's "Negotiating the Differend: A Feminist Trilogue," I also completed Barbara Kingsolver's *The Poisonwood Bible* (thanks, Ilene!), a novel in which a conservative, white, Eisenhower-era Southern Baptist named Nathan Price volunteers himself, his wife Orleanna, and their four daughters to "minister" to families in what was once called the Belgian Congo. The novel is a searing commentary on Africa, politics, and whiteness as well as truth, justice, and the American way. When one of the Price daughters, Adah, reflects on her family's role in the Congo, she names their unconscious imperialistic arrogance and explains their ministerial ineffectiveness by focusing on how language differences affect U.S.-Congo relations, both national and personal: "*Dundu* is a kind of antelope. Or it is a small plant of the genus *Veronia*. Or a hill. Or a price you have to pay. *So much depends on the tone of voice*. One of these things is what our family has coming to us. Our Baptist ears from Georgia will never understand the difference" (175; emphasis added). As I began writing this response, I found it impossible to separate the trilogue and *The Poisonwood Bible* in my mind. Why? Because both texts explore how to negotiate a differend.

What is a differend? According to Davis (via Jean-François Lyotard and Avital Ronell), *differend* signifies "unresolved differences between two (or more) parties who don't share the same rules of cognition—that is, who don't operate within the same 'genres of discourse,' within the

same 'language games' or 'phrase regimens.' The differend . . . 'carves out an abyss within interlocution; cables have not been set up to hear the other without static, warping, and constant interruption,'" and, I might add, without power differentials (590). In *The Poisonwood Bible*, Kingsolver explores the differend between the American Price family and Congolese families—specifically, the gaps in their perceptions of one another's ethics, politics, and power. In the trilogue, Ballif, Davis, and Mountford explore differends between academic feminists—specifically, the gaps in their perceptions of one another's ethics, politics, and power. The authors cite several differends haunting academic feminism (those between second- and third-wave feminists, between white and nonwhite feminists, and between African-American feminists), and they argue that these differends may inadvertently foster unproductive and unnecessarily hurtful exchanges among feminists—or, what they call "feminist trashing in the parlor" (618). The focus of their trilogue, however, narrows to the differend within rhetoric and composition studies between cultural and ludic feminists. (Other words for "cultural" are "material" and "red"; other words for "ludic" are "postmodern" and "French.")

In response to the trilogue, I want to eavesdrop on Michelle, Diane, and Roxanne's conversation and write back. (Because the authors' first names function as dialogue tags in the trilogue, I will use them here too.) I should probably say from the outset that I find myself more theoretically aligned with Roxanne (we usually "get it" when we talk to each other, without too much static or abyss-jumping). But I should also say that I am always learning from Michelle and Diane (even—no, *especially*—when my materialist feminism impels me to shake my head and wonder whether their world is my world and vice versa). And because so much depends on tone of voice, I hope my tone here engenders the respect I feel for all of their writings. Having said that, I also want to say that my goal for this response is to question the terms of our disciplinary alignments with cultural and ludic feminisms.

First, I want to emphasize the importance of the trilogue. A cultural feminist might suggest its importance is not only in naming a problem (the differend) but also in offering a plan of action (negotiation). A ludic feminist might suggest its importance is not only in identifying the cultural/ludic differend but also in inviting readers to stay on the question. So much depends on the figures we think through. In my view, its importance is this: the trilogue names the cultural/ludic feminist differend; it theorizes that we should negotiate this differend "by coming (together)